Patterns of coopetition in meta-organizations by Azzam, Jamal Eddine & Berkowitz, Héloïse
1 
 











Jamal Eddine Azzam 









Coopetition addresses the question of when and how to cooperate with competitors in 
order to create value. Few studies have focused on the dynamics of coopetition in meta-
organizations, especially in highly competitive and protected domains such as intellectual 
property. In this chapter, we tackle this issue by exploring coopetition among actors who agree 
to license their patents through meta-organizational devices such as patent pools. These meta-
organizations result in different crisscrossing patterns of coopetition in market and non-market 
environments with three objectives: 1) creating value, 2) appropriating value and 3) preserving 







Coopetition, as a concept, suggests that firms address uncertainty by adopting strategies 
simultaneously combining cooperation and competition (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Yami, Castaldo, Dagnino, & Le Roy, 2010). Such 
paradoxical strategies pursue various objectives, such as conducting precompetitive R&D, 
introducing new technological standards, opening new markets, and developing complex 
products. This perspective in strategic management addresses managerial concerns about when 
and how to cooperate with competitors to create and capture value. This chapter argues that 
coopetition in the highly competitive and protected domain of intellectual property permits the 
solving of complex problems such as anti-common problems or trolling and value destruction 
by non-practicing entities. Patent pools are independent organizations through which more than 
three members (firms, research centers, universities, etc.) agree to license their patents to each 
other and to any third parties. These devices aim to solve, at least partly, the coopetition tensions 
of intellectual property, but relatively little is known about the resulting internal and external 
dynamics of coopetition at the level of patent pools. 
This chapter develops an organizational approach to analyze how competing firms 
cooperate to collectively address patent-related concerns. To do so, we study meta-
organizations in the field of patents (Berkowitz & Bor, 2017). Meta-organizations are 
organizations in which members are themselves organizations, and they aim to collectively 
control external organizations and to influence the surrounding environment (Ahrne & 
Brunsson, 2008; Berkowitz & Dumez, 2016; Gulati, Puranam, & Tushman, 2012). As such, 
meta-organizations constitute a device through which organizations avoid uncertainty and 
create negotiated environments (Cyert, March, & others, 1963). Only a few studies have 
focused on coopetition and meta-organizations (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016). In addition, 
little research has thoroughly examined how coopetition can take shape at the inter-
organizational level and in both market and non-market environments. This chapter aims to 
better understand such coopetition dynamics in meta-organizations by studying intellectual 
property arrangements such as patent pools.  
We show that patent pools and other forms of patenting arrangements, as meta-
organizations, follow different patterns of coopetition in market and non-market environments, 
with three objectives: 1) creating value, 2) appropriating value and 3) preserving created value 
for members. We contribute to the meta-organization literature by making explicit some of the 
conditions of valuable coopetition (Berkowitz & Dumez, 2016). Further, we clarify how and 
why competitors cooperate on patents and open a new avenue for research on coopetition to 
explore its stakes beyond the dyadic value creation-value appropriation. 
This chapter is organized as follows. It first describes coopetition tensions that exist in 
intellectual property. Then, we show the relevance of analyzing patent pools as meta-
organizations and the governance mechanisms that are developed to reduce tensions. Finally, 
we discuss the resulting patterns of coopetition in market and non-market environments. 
 
 
1. Coopetition tensions in the domain of patents 
 
The literature on coopetition highlights drivers, tensions, processes and outcomes of 
such strategic behaviors at different levels and in different empirical settings (for a review, see 
Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Gnyawali & Song, 2016). Patents represent a strategic resource based 
on the right to exclude others from using technological inventions (Ayerbe & Chanal, 2010; 
Hall, 1992; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013). Clarifying how competing firms cooperate on patents adds 
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another piece to the puzzle of implementing a coopetition strategy (Cassiman, Di Guardo, & 
Valentini, 2009; Faems, Janssens, & Van Looy, 2010; Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014; 
Seran, Pellegrin-Boucher, & Gurau, 2016). Furthermore, exploring coopetition in a context 
such as intellectual property could enhance the understanding of patent strategies and their 
patterns. We aim to contribute to the coopetition field by exploring how and why competitors 
cooperate on patents. 
 
1.1 The anti-commons problem in intellectual property  
 
Many technology-based sectors such as biotechnology, consumer electronic, 
semiconductor and telecommunications are characterized by a multi-invention setting where 
independent actors such as individual inventors, universities and firms develop and patent 
technological components that form the final products ( Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Hobday, Rush, 
& Tidd, 2000; Somaya, Teece, & Wakeman, 2011). In such settings, firms must address the 
problem of patent fragmentation or patent thicket, which is “an overlapping set of patent rights 
requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple 
patentees” (Shapiro, 2000, p. 119). This problem of patent blocking creates what Heller and 
Eisenberg (1998, p. 698) described as an anti-commons tragedy “when multiple owners each 
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of 
use”. In other words, the multiplication of blocking patents could lead to the underuse of a 
technology. This occurs when those wanting to use and build on a technology must address the 
challenging and expensive task of acquiring licenses from multiple patent holders (Somaya et 
al., 2011).  
The problem of patent blocking concerns not only firms wanting to use the technology 
but also its developers or promoters. Indeed, their individual and parallel investments in R&D 
lead them to have a limited number of all patents required for secured-market operation. This 
is particularly the case for standardized technologies, as epitomized by the Blu-Ray video. This 
standard was introduced in 2006 and developed by more than twenty independent (and 
competing) companies individually holding a (small) part of all the related patents. 
 
1.2 The problem of trolling and value destruction by non-practicing entities 
 
Patent “trolls” or patent “sharks” are “corporations that seek to generate supra-normal 
returns on patent-protected technology through the suing of inadvertent infringers in one-shot 
trials” (Reitzig, Henkel, & Schneider, 2010, p. 948). They are non-practicing entities (NPEs) 
in the sense that they do not invest in R&D activities and do not develop or commercialize 
products. Rather, NPEs exploit information asymmetries in markets and acquire patents from 
financially distressed actors (start-ups, individual inventors or universities) to trigger profitable 
hold-up situations (Pénin, 2012). Their target for infringement lawsuits and royalty extraction 
are practicing entities, that is, firms with market-related activities and investments, sued either 
individually (for instance, RIM by NTP) or more often collectively (for example, Acacia against 
manufacturers of healthcare information technologies) (Tucker, 2014). Figure 1 reflects the 
evolution of patent litigation against publicly traded firms in the US1. 
  
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the problem of patent trolling is not specific to the American context, since other 
evidence in Europe shows that NPEs are responsible for approximately 10% of patent suits in the field in Germany 




Figure 1: Patent litigation against publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2015 in the 
US 
 
Source: Cohen et al. (2016 p.522) 
For firms, trolling is a major threat. A deputy general counsel for patents at Google who 
recently experienced litigation by NPEs2 explains that “patent owners sell patents for numerous 
reasons (such as the need to raise money or changes in a company’s business direction). 
Unfortunately, the usual patent marketplace can sometimes be challenging, especially for 
smaller participants who sometimes end up working with patent trolls. Then bad things happen, 
like lawsuits, lots of wasted effort, and generally bad karma”. Bessen and Meurer (2013) 
estimated that the tax on innovation exerted by NPEs, that is, the direct cost to defendants’ 
firms, was $29 billion in 2011, and they found that much of this tax falls on small and medium-
sized companies3.  
Other empirical evidence shows the negative impacts of lawsuits by NPEs on innovation 
by firms and their investments in R&D. Bessen et al. (2011) found that defendants have lost 
over half a trillion dollars from 1990 to 2010 and over $83 billion per year between 2007 and 
2010, which is the equivalent of more than one-fourth of U.S. industrial R&D spending each 
year. In the case of small firms, Smeets (2014) identified an evident negative impact (2.6% to 
4.7%) of patent litigation on subsequent R&D intensity. More recently, Cohen et al. (2016) 
analyzed data on patent litigation in the US between 2005 and 2015 and found that firms on 
average reduce their R&D investment by >25% after settling with NPEs. Other evidence shows 
the negative impact of patent litigation by NPEs on incremental innovations. Tucker (2014) 
analyzed the case of the healthcare information technology ‘PACS4’ and identified a sales 
decline by one-third that was not the result of a suppression of demand by hospitals. Rather, 
hospitals’ demand for the improvement of imaging IT solutions was unsatisfied during the 
period of litigation between the NPE and the sued firms. This resulted in lower incremental 
product innovation. Overall, these studies show that NPEs’ opportunistic, predatory behavior 
negatively impacts sued firms and hinders innovation without increasing small-inventor 
                                                 
2 In 2012, Google was the target of lawsuits by two NPEs (SimpleAir and Vringo) claiming the violation of their 
patents by two products developed by Google: the online advertising service Adwords and the operating system 
Android. 
3 The only legal cost per defense (outside counsel, prior art search, jury consultants, etc.) is $420,000 for small 
and medium-sized firms and $1.52 million for large firms (Bessen and Meurer, 2014). Other elements such as 
negotiation and potential damages contribute to the total cost  
4 The PACS (picture archival and communications system) is a medical imaging technology used by hospitals for 
economic storage and used as an access facility for large amounts of data and images from multiple imaging 
devices. This lawsuit was launched by Hospital Systems Corporation, a subsidiary of Acacia, one of the largest 
patent-assertion companies, with 536 patents in 2011, against GE Healthcare, Fujifilm Medical Systems, Siemens 
Medical Solutions, Philips Electronics and McKesson Corp. 
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activity. Hence, from both managerial and public welfare points of view, NPEs represent a 
serious threat due to the cost of their actions and the detrimental effects on innovation. 
We have highlighted several tensions relative to coopetition in intellectual property. We 
now consider why it is relevant to analyze these dimensions at the level of the meta-
organization. 
 
2. Meta-organizations as a relevant level of analysis 
 
Chiambaretto and Dumez (2016) showed that meta-organizations in the airline industry 
allowed the development of multilevel coopetition strategies. In the intellectual property 
domain, setting up meta-organizations also emerges as an efficient collective strategy to address 
coopetition tensions and concerns. Therefore, we argue that meta-organizations are a relevant 
level of analysis of coopetition in intellectual property as well.  
 
 
2.1 Patent pools as coopetitive meta-organizations 
 
Indeed, an effective strategy to address the problem of patent fragmentation and 
blocking is the aggregation of patents related to a technological standard in a meta-organization. 
The objective of such a strategy is to make the patents essential to a standard available to all its 
potential adopters. Such aggregation takes the form of patent pools. Patent pools are 
independent organizations through which more than three members (firms, research centers, 
universities, etc.) agree to license their patents to each other and to any third parties (den Uijl 
et al., 2013; Layne-Farrar & Lerner, 2011; Lerner, Strojwas, & Tirole, 2007; Lerner & Tirole, 
2004). In that sense, patent pools constitute coopetitive meta-organizations, i.e., formal 
associations of competitors that develop both cooperative and competitive strategies. Patent 
pools have been used to promote many technological standards, such as Blu-Ray, MPEG, and 
MVC. Table 1 provides some examples of patent pools. They operate as one-stop shopping to 
bundle many complementary patents essential to a specific technological standard and owned 
by many independent actors. The latter commit to licensing all their patents essential to the 
technological standard promoted through the pool and to not taking any action to subvert such 
commitment. The pool’s licensees can be the other patent holders but could also be non-patent 
holders, whether they are incumbents, new entrants, large players or small ones. Then, collected 





Table 1: Examples of patent pools and their characteristics 
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641 1145 1080 7600 3612 
Number of 
licensees 
302 41 1164 73 47 
Source: Adapted from Ayerbe and Azzam (2015) Uijl et al. (2013) 
 
Patent pools are based on cooperation to promote the use of technological standards. 
This can be at a global level, such as MPEG2 for the video compression used in DVD players 
and recorders, TVs, personal computers, or game machines, or at a regional level, such as 
ARIB-Uldage for Japanese Digital Broadcasting. In some cases, different competing patent 
pools can emerge. This is the case for the Blu-Ray video standard around which two patent 
pools have developed: One-Blue by Sony and its allies and PremierBD by Toshiba and its 
partners. Whatever their number in a given field, patent pools sustain cooperation between firms 
through the grant-back clause implying that all participants (patent holders and licensees) 
commit to licensing back patents of any improvements related to the standard (Lerner et al., 
2007; Lerner & Tirole, 2004). 
However, patent pools may experience internal competition between patent holders who 
seek to achieve both economic and strategic goals5. One could observe in table 1 that most 
                                                 
5 We report only “fair” competitive behaviors here. However, other unfair behaviors exist, such as patent 
dissimulation to create a hold-up situation (see Lerner, Strojwas, & Tirole, 2007). In 2007, the administrator of the 
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patent holders are competitors in their respective markets. These actors join pools for common 
access to patents and hence ensure their ability to develop and commercialize products. 
Members also try to compete collectively against alternative technological standards. However, 
patent holders are interested in the royalties that patent pools generate. For this reason, they try 
to enhance their power by integrating more and more patents. Indeed, the share of royalties is 
based, in many patent pools, on the number of essential patents integrated (Layne-Farrar & 
Lerner, 2011). Figure 2 shows the distribution of patent ownership in two patent pools related 
to the Blu-Ray video standard. 
 
 





Competition within patent pools concerns not only patent ownership and patent 
insertion but also the determination of royalties. Patent holders are not homogeneous: some are 
companies with market operations (vertically integrated firms), while others are without market 
activities, such as universities, research institutes or firms specialized in R&D. Royalties (from 
pools) are the main source of revenue for this second group of patent holders. Vertically 
integrated firms must apply for licenses and pay royalties when they decide to join patent pools, 
notably when their products use the pool’s patents.  
Finally, the licensing terms of patent pools can induce another form of competition 
between patent holders. Indeed, patent pools with complementary patents allow members to 
engage in independent licensing (Lerner et al., 2007; Lerner & Tirole, 2004). This clause 
implies that patent holders are free to license their individual pooled patents for an unrelated 
use without sharing related revenues with other pool members. Indeed, patented inventions 
could be used in multiple fields, as is the case for technologies related to the MPEG2 standard 
for digital video compression, also used in products such as DVDs and high-definition 
television (Lerner et al., 2007). Hence, the agreement states that the “MPEG-2 Licensor will 
grant MPEGLA a nonexclusive license under its Essential Patents, while retaining the right to 
license them independently for any purpose, including for making MPEG-2-compliant 
                                                 
patent pool MPEG2 sued one of the pool’s members, Alcatel-Lucent, for breach of contractual obligations. Indeed, 
Alcatel-Lucent transferred patents essential to the standard MPEG2 to a newly created company (Multimedia 
Patent Trust) to extract additional royalties and hence avoid the contractual commitment of placing essential 
patents in the patent pool. 
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products”6. In turn, this rule represents a window for more competition to generate additional 
income by licensing the same patents in another field and hence to outperform the other patent 
holders (Ayerbe and Azzam, (2015). 
 
2.2 Organizational mechanisms in a coopetitive meta-organization 
 
Coopetitive meta-organizations may develop specific features as a response to patent 
trolling. Indeed, companies’ concerns over predation by NPEs and the associated risk of value 
destruction lead some firms to take initiatives to make available and transparent information 
about existing patents, technology value and patent transactions. The objective is to identify 
potential NPEs and inhibit their opportunistic behavior.  
The LOT Network (License on Transfer) was created in June 2014 at the initiative of 
Google, three other large companies (Canon, Dropbox, Google, and SAP) and two startups 
(Asana and Newegg) from the information and technology sectors. The LOT Network is a non-
profit organization aiming to solve the trolling problem and to reduce litigation risk by NPE 
litigation. The LOT Network permits the immunizing of more than 600,000 worldwide patents 
owned by approximately one hundred member companies and other actors, such as NGOs. 
Among these companies, several are direct competitors in their respective sectors, such as CBS, 
Netflix and Showtime in media; Amazon and Google in Internet-related services; SAS and SAP 
in software development; Canon, GoPro, Lenovo and Mundo Reader in consumer electronic 
devices; and Subaru, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mazda and Nissan 
in automotive. The common purpose of these companies is to trace patent transactions and 
changes in patent ownership to anticipate NPE predation strategies. In doing so, operating 
companies can focus their attention and resources on innovation and product development, as 
the director of IP development at Hyundai Motor7 explains: “by joining the LOT Network, we 
will use this opportunity to focus more on R&D rather than using resources to fight against 
unnecessary lawsuits from NPEs. I hope this will help the automobile industry build healthier 
environment for its customers”.  
The operating mode of LOT is that companies deliberately decide to join the network 
and submit their patents. Once a company joins the network, it maintains ownership of the 
submitted patents. However, the network a priori commits to give licenses to all other members 
when it sells one (or more) of these patents to a third-party actor (that is not a member of LOT) 
with more than 50% of revenues generated through patent assertion8. Hence, LOT member 
companies own a potential license on all the submitted patents to use them as immunity against 
any intimidation for patent infringement by an NPE. At the same time, companies keep 
ownership of their patent as well as the freedom to use them for other purposes (assert, license 
or cross-license), as a senior VP and chief IP counsel at SAP9 explains: “the structure of the 
LOT Network helps protect innovative patent owners from unwarranted litigation, without 
stifling valid, beneficial uses of patents…As long as a company owns their patent they retain 
all their rights to it”. Furthermore, LOT is open to all companies seeking immunization against 
NPE predation even if they do not own patents. 
                                                 
6 https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/215742.htm#N_11_  
7 http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160201005240/en/LOT-Network-Demonstrates-Rapid-Growth-
Community-Battle 
8 “What’s notable about LOT is that because each of our members agree to provide licenses to one another once a 
patent asset falls into the hands of a PAE (patent assertion entity), we’ve established a way to essentially immunize 





LOT aims to generate a network effect to attract more innovative companies (large 
companies or startups) and to become more attractive for other potential participants. At the 
end of 2017, LOT attracted more than 100 companies from various sectors (automotive, 
banking, computer, electronic, IT, media, retailing, etc.). To achieve this, LOT applies an 
adjusted membership fee depending on each member company’s annual revenues (from $1,500 
a year for companies with less than $10 million in revenue to $20,000 a year for companies 
with revenue greater than $1 billion). After the creation of LOT in 2014, some members have 
sold certain patents to other outside players, including NPEs, but none of the other members 
has been attacked for violation of these patents.  
 
 
3. Lessons learned: crisscrossing patterns of coopetition inside and outside meta-
organizations  
 
Meta-organizations in the patent field raise interesting and complex issues of 
coopetition at different levels, as Chiambaretto and Dumez (2016) noted for the airline industry. 
First, at the internal level, by bringing together competitors in a formal organization, in our case 
patent pools and LOT Network, meta-organizations aim to increase cooperation among certain 
types of actors. Different benefits may result from gathering in such coopetitive meta-
organizations, as we synthesize in Table 2. However, simultaneously, meta-organizations may 
result in unfair, opportunistic internal strategies among members (e.g., hiding patents). 
 
Table 2: Meta-organizations’ objectives in different cases of patent pools 








Created value preservation 
 
 
Such coopetitive meta-organizations achieve three kinds of objectives. First, they may 
facilitate value creation for member companies through technological standard diffusion and 
cost reduction of negotiation to access key patents. In addition, they permit value appropriation 
thanks to royalties. Finally, some meta-organizations (e.g., LOT Network) even allow members 
to preserve created value by developing mechanisms to prevent opportunistic behaviors. 
However, there can be cases where the meta-organization itself enters into conflict with one of 
its members, as we showed in the case of the MPEG2. This occurs when a member develops 
its own strategy, discarding collectively defined rules at the meta-organizational level. These 
results contribute to the literature on meta-organizations by identifying conditions under which 
coopetition may be valuable or deterrent (Berkowitz & Dumez, 2016). 
Second, at the external level, meta-organizations create a coherent group of actors who 
may enter into competition with other meta-organizations. In patent pools, meta-organizational 
competition addresses imposing standards. Competition now occurs among groups of 
cooperating competitors. In that sense, meta-organizations’ development triggers a shift in the 
coopetition’s gravity center that may exist at the industry level: gravity moves from player to 





Table 3: Coopetitive dimensions of market and non-market strategies in patent pools 
 Market environment  Nonmarket environment 
MPEG 2  Competition (on prices, 
products, innovations, etc.) 
Cooperation (sharing patents)  
Competition (increasing patent 
shares to earn more royalties) 
LOT Network Competition (on prices, 
products, innovation, etc.)  
Cooperation to prevent 
opportunistic behaviors 
 
Patent pools are a rare case where the meta-organization facilitates market strategies 
through cooperation among competitors in a nonmarket environment (see Table 3). This case 
brings interesting insights regarding tensions related to coopetition. The literature stresses 
separation mechanisms to manage coopetition-related tensions, i.e., cooperating in a specific 
field (domain or activity) and competing in another field (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Fernandez 
& Chiambaretto, 2016; Seran et al., 2016). The concept of the meta-organization shows how 
tension between cooperation and competition can persist despite this separation. Indeed, patent 
pools are created by organizations that compete in a market environment to cooperate in a 
nonmarket environment. However, these organizations continue to compete to capture value 
within meta-organizations despite the cooperative orientation.  
The coexistence of cooperation and competition within meta-organizations adds to the 
competition between member organizations in the market environment through price and/or 
product strategies. In addition to this coopetition within meta-organization, we have shown 
earlier that standard wars may add yet another layer of competition among meta-organizations. 
Highlighting these crisscrossing patterns of coopetition resulting from the establishment of 




In this chapter, we analyzed and discussed collective intellectual property arrangements 
as examples of coopetitive meta-organizations, i.e., formal associations of competitors that 
develop both cooperative and competitive strategies. In the case of intellectual property, 
coopetition occurs both within and outside of meta-organizations. Patent pools and other 
arrangements such as LOT Network indeed constitute a meta-organizational response to two 
major concerns in the field of intellectual property: anti-commons and trolling. However, meta-
organizations may result in unfair, opportunistic internal strategies among members (e.g., 
hiding patents). Meta-organizations also contribute to increased competition outside of their 
membership through standard wars that oppose certain meta-organizations.  
Our chapter highlights that these meta-organizations follow different patterns of 
coopetition in market and non-market environments. These meta-organizations’ have three 
objectives: 1) creating value, 2) appropriating value and 3) preserving created value for 
members. Such meta-organizations’ development results in a shift in coopetition. From industry 
coopetition, it moves to coopetition between the member and the meta-organization (when 
individual strategy conflicts with collective strategy) or, above all, to coopetition across meta-
organizations (in standards wars).  
In the field of intellectual property, patterns of coopetition appear to be multilevel 
(organizational, meta-organizational), multidimensional (market and nonmarket) and 
crisscrossing. Further investigating these crisscrossing patterns of coopetition could provide a 
better understanding of both the optimization of patenting strategies and the efficient 
governance of patent pools. Studying coopetition in or through meta-organizations is an 
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emerging and promising venue of research (Berkowitz & Bor, 2017; Chiambaretto & Dumez, 
2016). Future research could further investigate the links between forms of meta-organizations 
(membership, sector, governance mechanisms) and coopetition patterns across patent pools, for 
instance, using qualitative comparative analysis.  
Another fruitful path would involve modeling the optimal meta-organization 
membership for companies. Studying firms’ membership as a portfolio of meta-organizations 
would allow for the analysis of the costs and benefits of such strategies, as well as the synergies 
that can exist among meta-organizations and further the understanding of patenting strategies. 
Further, it would be interesting to analyze how members derive value from this membership 
and which organizational capabilities they build on to do so. This would contribute to ongoing 
research efforts to better understand the management of coopetition (Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, & 
Vanyushyn, 2016; Fernandez et al., 2014; Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). 
Lastly, an interesting venue for research entails investigating the impacts and dynamics 
of eco-responsible patent pools. The Eco-Patent Commons is an organization established by 
private companies and administered by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD). Its objective is to diffuse ‘green’ patents. The Eco-Patent Commons 
aims to make available (without royalties), to all participant and non-participant companies, 
patents related to technologies for energy conservation and efficiency, pollution prevention, 
materials reduction, and increased recycling ability. Beyond securing the use of environment-
friendly technologies, the pool also aims to provide an open platform for collaboration among 
competitors for a cross-fertilization of sustainability-related technological competencies. In-
depth case studies of this pool and its members would pave the way for understanding the role 
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